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Abstract. Malicious software are categorized into families based on
their static and dynamic characteristics, infection methods, and nature of
threat. Visual exploration of malware instances and families in a low di-
mensional space helps in giving a first overview about dependencies and
relationships among these instances, detecting their groups and isolat-
ing outliers. Furthermore, visual exploration of different sets of features
is useful in assessing the quality of these sets to carry a valid abstract
representation, which can be later used in classification and clustering
algorithms to achieve a high accuracy. In this paper, we investigate one of
the best dimensionality reduction techniques known as t-SNE to reduce
the malware representation from a high dimensional space consisting of
thousands of features to a low dimensional space. We experiment with
different feature sets and depict malware clusters in 2-D. Surprisingly,
t-SNE does not only provide nice 2-D drawings, but also dramatically
increases the generalization power of SVM classifiers. Moreover, obtained
results showed that cross-validation accuracy is much better using the
2-D embedded representation of samples than using the original high-
dimensional representation.
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1 Introduction
Security breaches are executed through malwares and are a major threat to the
Internet today. There are several forms of malware ranging from viruses and
spam bots to trojan horses and rootkits [12]. Recently, the Petya ransomware
[1] crashed shipping companies, ports, and law agencies. This malware targets
the master boot record of a machine and prohibits the operating system from
normal execution. It then spreads and encrypts all the system files. A message
appears on the screen stating the amount of ransom to decrypt the files. The
payment is through crypto-currencies. The prominent expansion of malwares is
due to their metamorphic and polymorphic techniques that give the ability to
change their code as they propagate. In addition, malwares adopt new ways to
detect the environments where they are running, hence hindering their detection
and making dynamic analysis difficult if not impossible.
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Visual analytics provides approaches to obtain an understanding from com-
plex data. It aims at developing methods that allow analysts to examine the
processes underlying the data [4]. Visual exploration of malware families is a
pre-processing step of a more in-depth malware family analysis, as it allows for
the development of intuitions and hypotheses about the discriminative power of
a set of contextual or behavioral features. However, visualizing malware families
in low dimensional space (2-D, 3-D) is a topic that received little attention in
the literature. Malware data are fundamentally different than text and images1
which motivates investigating ways to adapt existing approaches or inventing
new ones. For instance a byte in malware has different meanings in different
contexts, in contrast to a byte representing pixel intensity in an image.
In this paper, we experiment with the best low-dimensional embedding tech-
nique known as t-SNE (Student-t distribution – Stochastic Neighborhood Em-
bedding) for depicting malware clusters and features. We propose a pipeline
for feature extraction and selection, followed by visualization. We compare the
raw classification accuracy at the high-dimensional and low-dimensional spaces
for n-grams features. Finally We propose a new first-insight classifier based on
t-SNE and SVM. Note that our goal is not to propose a very high accuracy
classifier or to compete with extensive feature selection approaches. Instead, we
aim at exploring the visualization space of malware families and to which extent
such a pre-processing procedure might be useful for analyzing a typical malware
dataset. The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 surveys
relevant related work. Section 3 presents our proposed methodology. In Section
4, we discuss implementation and results. We finally conclude in Section 5 and
present future research directions.
2 Background and Related Work
Classifying and Clustering malware families were addressed in many recent work
in the literature. In [7], the current automated approaches for malware cluster-
ing were summarized. The paper considered the high accuracy obtained by six
commercial anti-viruses as biased since unbalanced datasets were used where
most malware instances are easy to classify. A plagiarism detector algorithm
was applied on the same dataset and yielded the same accuracy results com-
pared to those of the anti-viruses, though the plagiarism detector does not have
any expert knowledge about malwares. In [2] a scalable, behavior-based mal-
ware clustering approach was proposed. This approach aims to isolate outliers
that exhibit a novel behavior to be further analyzed. It used a recent technique
called taint tracking to build behavioral profiles and locality sensitive hashing
for clustering these profiles. Malware instance visualization was proposed in [9].
This approach suggested transforming the binary into a vector of 8-bit integers,
which can be reshaped into a matrix and therefore viewed as a gray-scale image.
This technique proves useful in increasing the accuracy of malware classifiers.
The work presented in this paper is different such that we focus on visualizing
1 http://www.jsylvest.com/blog/2017/12/malconv/
families of malwares as scatter plots using t-SNE [8], an embedding technique
that allows visualizing high-dimensional data by giving each datapoint a location
in a two or three-dimensional map. The technique is a variation of Stochastic
Neighbor Embedding (SNE).
SNE starts by converting the high-dimensional Euclidean distances between
datapoints into conditional probabilities that represent similarities. The simi-
larity of datapoint xj to datapoint xi is the conditional probability, pj|i , that
xi would pick xj as its neighbor if neighbors were picked in proportion to their
probability density under a Gaussian centered at xi. For the low-dimensional
counterparts yi and yj of xi and xj , it is possible to compute a similar condi-
tional probability qj|i. SNE aims to find a low-dimensional data representation
that minimizes the mismatch between pj|i and qj|i. To do so, SNE minimizes the
sum of Kullback-Leibler divergences over all datapoints using a gradient descent
method. t-SNE differs from the old SNE in two ways: (1) it uses a symmetrized
version of the SNE cost function with simpler gradients and (2) it uses a heavy-
tailed Student-t distribution rather than a Gaussian distribution to compute the
similarity between two points in the low-dimensional space. This allows t-SNE
to alleviate both the so-called crowding problem and the optimization problems
of SNE [8].
The dataset we use is the training set from Microsoft Malware Classification
Challenge [11] released in 2015, which since has been studied by researchers in
more than 50 publications targeting feature engineering, deep learning, cluster-
ing and classification approaches. For instance, [5] proposes using convolutional
neural networks for feature extraction and classification based on the binary and
reconstructed assembly files. Our work takes another direction and focuses on
the visualization question.
3 Proposed Methodology
In this section we describe our proposed methodology which copes with relatively
large data sets. We have used the training dataset from Microsoft malware classi-
fication challenge (Big 2015) having 10868 labeled instances [11]. The standard
version of t-SNE having quadratic complexity in terms of the number of in-
stances O(N2) might be applied. For larger data-sets, other versions of t-SNE
are proposed such as random-walk based sampling of landmark points or using
specialized data structures leading to O(N logN) complexity [14]. We particu-
larly used the version of scikit-learn with the Barnes-Hut approximation running
in O(N logN) time.
Fig. 1 shows the pipeline of our proposed methodology. Starting from a la-
beled corpus of files containing the malwares payload in hexadecimal format,
we extract n-byte grams (3, 4 and 5). Note that the number of features grow
exponentially such that for 3-byte grams we have 28∗3 possible words, for 4-byte
grams it is 28∗4 and so on. Most current machine learning libraries cannot handle
this number of features even in sparse format. For example, Scikit-learn accepts
feature indices less than a positive 4-bytes signed integer (231−1). Therefore, in
the proposed methodology, we hash the feature indices to 22-bits integers. We
also proceed by early removal of rare words that appear less than k times (we
assumed k = 3). These words probably represent addresses in memory or literals
and have little differentiation power. This technique is very efficient in reducing
the storage amount of the features set. We store the resulting features along with
the instance label in sparse format (LibSVM/SVMLight format) as one line per
instance in the output text file. Each feature is represented by an index (the
hash of the n-bytes gram) and a value which is the number of occurrences of this
n-bytes gram in the malware instance. This stage is implemented by using the
Sally tool [10] which is an efficient feature extraction tool that generates n-grams
besides other features such as TF-IDF [3].
We proceed with a first feature selection stage using the χ2 statistical test-
based selector where our target is to reduce the number of features to 1,000.
This limit reduces the complexity of computing the pair-wise distances in t-
SNE. However, we are starting with a much larger number (222 = 4, 194, 304
feature-space). The time complexity of the χ2 selector is O(nclasses ∗ nfeatures).
The features that are the most likely to be independent of class and therefore
irrelevant for classification are removed.
We also can reduce the space complexity of this stage (mainly because of
memory limitations) by sampling the instances in equal proportions to their
family sizes. If sampling is used than we must use the generated χ2 selector
model to transform the complete dataset and keep the top 1, 000 features of
each instance. For the dataset in question we did not use sampling.
Fig. 1. Pipeline for malware family visualization.
Optionally, we apply a PCA (Principal Component Analysis) transformation
to reduce further the number of features to the range of 30-50 features. This
speeds up the computation of pairwise distances between the data-points in the
next stage and suppresses some noise without severely distorting the inter-point
distances [8]. t-SNE then embeds these features in 2 dimensions. The malware
instances are depicted as scatter plots. t-SNE outperforms other data embedding
techniques such as PCA, Sammon mapping, Isomap and LLE.
4 Implementation, Preliminary Results, and
Interpretation
In this section, we describe the implementation environment and setup, the
dataset used, the hyper parameters then we discuss the obtained results.
4.1 Setup, implementation, and tools
All our experiments were performed using a commercial off-the-shelf laptop with
a 64-bit Ubuntu 16.04 LTS operating system, an Intel core i5-5200U CPU (4
cores, 2.20GHz) 8 GB RAM and 1 TB Hard disk. Our implementation was based
on Python v3.6, numpy v1.13, scipy v0.19 and the Scikit-learn v0.19 library. The
plots are generated using the BokehJS v0.12 library. We have used Sally [10]
for feature extraction. Our code is available at https://github.com/mnassar/
malware-viz under form of Python Jupyter notebooks for further exploration
and result reproducibility.
4.2 Dataset
The dataset is the training set from Microsoft Malware Classification Challenge
[11], which includes 10868 labeled samples. For each sample, the raw data and
meta data are provided. The raw data contains the hexadecimal representation of
the file’s binary content, without the Portable Executable (PE) header to ensure
sterility. The metadata manifest is a log containing various metadata information
extracted from the binary, such as function calls, strings, etc. This was generated
using the IDA disassembler tool. In our implementation, we focused solely on the
raw data. However, we consider augmenting our visualization with the meta data
for future work. The raw training data volume is about 41 GBytes. However, our
feature selection method reduces this to about 6.4 GBytes for the sum of three
feature sets (3, 4 and 5-grams). The dataset contains malwares belonging to the
following 9 families: Ramnit, Lollipop, Kelihos Ver. 3, Vundo, Simda, Tracur,
Kelihos Ver. 1, Obfuscator.ACY and Gatak. One challenge of this data set is
the unbalanced sizes of different families. The distribution of instances for the
training dataset is shown in Table 1. It is shown that classes 4, 5, 6 and 7 are
underrepresented as compared to the other families.
4.3 t-SNE parameters
t-SNE implementation in Sklearn has many tunable parameters. We show the
most important ones with a short description in Table 2. Note that the t-SNE
method is known to be little sensitive to these parameters. Nevertheless, a good
tuning enhances the quality of the obtained clusters sometimes.
Table 1. Distribution of samples among the families.
Class Family Type Nb. Of Instances Percentage (%)
1 Ramnit Worm 1541 14.20
2 Lollipop Adware 2478 22.80
3 Kelihos ver 3 Backdoor 2942 27.07
4 Vundo Trojan 475 4.37
5 Simda Backdoor 42 0.39
6 Tracur Trojan Downloader 751 6.91
7 Kelihos ver 1 Backdoor 398 3.66
8 Obfuscator.ACY Obfuscated malware 1228 11.30
9 Gatak Backdoor 1013 9.32
Table 2. Tunable Parameters in t-SNE.
Parameter Description Typical/default value
Random state This is the seed of random initialization in
the embedded space. It is an important pa-
rameter to accomplish comparisons under
same initial conditions (used with init =
’random’)
No typical value. We
have chosen 42 as our de-
fault.
N iter Maximum number of iterations for the op-
timization.
Default: 1000
Perplexity The perplexity can be interpreted as a
smooth measure of the effective number of
neighbors.
5 – 50 Our default is 40
Early exaggeration Larger values of this parameter tend to
start with distant clusters in the embed-
ded space
Default: 12
metric The distance between instances where each
instance is a feature array.
Euclidean
Learning rate (lr) It must not be too low or too high. If the
cost function gets stuck in a bad local mini-
mum increasing the learning rate may help.
10 – 1000 We have cho-
sen 200 as our default.
4.4 Sample of results
Due to lack of space we do not show all obtained visual plots. However, we
depict and interpret the most important ones. Fig. 2 shows the scatter plot of
the 9 classes for 4-byte grams (no PCA). In this figure, it is directly noticed
that each family is composed of one or multiple clusters. No one clear cluster
per family exists as in the case of the MNIST dataset [6]. This is expected
due to the polymorphic nature of malware data which has much more noise
than what can be carried by handwritten digits or letters. Common evasion and
obfuscation techniques may also explain why some families have intersection
regions in between their clusters. Still we can identify big clusters for each of
the big families (1, 2, 3, 8, 9) and even some smaller clusters for the families 4
(Vundo) and 7 (Kelihos ver 1). It is also important to notice the existence of
some outliers.
To give a chance to the underrepresented families, we started over with only
their instances in the pipeline. Obtained results are shown in Fig. 3. These
results are much better, and we can observe clear groups for each of these small
families. Next, we take only the largest two classes (2 and 3) to compare plots
between different sets of features (3-bytes grams, 4-bytes grams and 5-bytes
grams). Obtained results are illustrated in Fig. 4. They show that to some extent,
5-grams (Fig. 4(c)) have less overlap between clusters than 3-grams (Fig. 4(a)) or
4-grams (Fig. 4(b)). We wanted to correlate this with the classification accuracy
on the original dataset (the one after feature selection which is 5420 instances *
1000 features) and the transformed dataset (5420 instances * 2 features). Results
in Table 3 shows that training accuracy is almost perfect for all three feature
sets. However, training accuracy is often not a good metric since the classifier
might overfit the training set.
We compute the two-fold cross validation accuracy which is much more in-
dicative of the generalization power of the classifier. Astonishingly, the two-fold
cross validation accuracy is very poor on the original dataset and dramatically
much better on the embedded dataset. This can be explained by the fact that
t-SNE groups the datapoints into separate clusters in a low dimensional space,
which is at the origin of the design of support vector classifiers with the Radial
Basis Function (RBF) kernel. These classifiers shine under this kind of settings.
The SVC accuracy (%) for the three feature sets with default Sklearn parameters
(RBF kernel, C = 1.0, γ = 1/nfeatures) are shown in Table 3. Better SVC accu-
racy results are usually obtained after a grid search for the best hyperparameters
C and γ.
Next, we examine the performance of t-SNE on unbalanced families. We take
the extreme case by choosing the largest family (Kelihos ver 3 – class 3) and the
smallest family (Simda – class 5). Results that are presented in Fig. 5 show
that t-SNE can isolate the class 5 in a small cluster. They also show that 4-
grams and 5-grams perform better than 3-grams in isolating clusters of the two
classes. Fig. 5(d) shows that choosing a bad perplexity value might degrade the
clustering quality.
Fig. 2. 4-grams, no-PCA, 9 classes, perplexity=40, lr=200.
Fig. 3. 4-grams, no-PCA, classes 4,5,6,7, perplexity=40, lr=200.
(a) (b)
(c)
Fig. 4. (a) Classes 2 and 3 (3-grams, perplexity=40, lr=200); (b) Classes 2 and 3 (4-
grams, perplexity=40, lr=200); (c) Classes 2 and 3 (5-grams, perplexity=40, lr=200)
Table 3. SVC Accuracy on different feature-sets (classes 2 and 3).
Feature Set Training Training Two-fold cross- Two-fold cross-
Accuracy Accuracy Validation Accuracy Validation Accuracy
(1000-d) (2-d) (1000-d) (2-d)
3-byte grams 99.98 99.98 67.91 99.57
4-byte grams 100.00 99.96 64.06 99.88
5-byte grams 99.98 99.98 68.13 99.92
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Fig. 5. (a) Classes 3 and 5 (3-grams, perplexity=40, lr=20); (b) Classes 3 and 5 (4-
grams, perplexity=40, lr=200); (c) Classes 3 and 5 (5-grams, perplexity=40, lr=200);
(d) Classes 3 and 5 (5-grams, perplexity=5, lr=200)
t-SNE shows similar performance in enhancing the classification accuracy
as shown in Table 4. Note that since the classes are severely unbalanced, an
accuracy of 98.60 would be simply obtained if the classifier considers all the
data points a belonging to the majority class 5. The two-fold cross validation
accuracies on the original dataset are bad in this sense. However, we notice that
the two-fold cross validation accuracy is much better in the embedded space.
3-grams features perform the worst as it can be expected by examining the
corresponding scatter plot.
Table 4. SVC Accuracy on different feature sets (classes 3 and 5)
Feature Set Training Training Two-fold cross- Two-fold cross-
Accuracy Accuracy Validation Accuracy Validation Accuracy
(1000-d) (2-d) (1000-d) (2-d)
3-byte grams 100.00 99.93 98.52 (bad) 99.83
4-byte grams 100.00 99.93 98.62 (bad) 99.90
5-byte grams 100.00 99.97 98.62 (bad) 99.90
Finally, we want to validate this hypothesis on the complete dataset (9-
classes). Results are shown in Table 5. The training accuracy in 2-d is a bit
smaller than in 1000-d but allows much better generalization of the classification
model as clearly inferred from the cross-validation accuracy results.
Table 5. SVC Accuracy on different feature sets (all classes)
Feature Set Training Training Two-fold cross- Two-fold cross-
Accuracy Accuracy Validation Accuracy Validation Accuracy
(1000-d) (2-d) (1000-d) (2-d)
3-byte grams 99.66 96.84 56.76 94.26
4-byte grams 99.58 96.22 55.26 93.13
5-byte grams 98.25 95.69 60.24 92.58
4.5 Testing Accuracy
In this section we further assess the idea of squeezing the dimensions into a small
hyperspace using t-SNE than expanding it back to infinite dimensional space
using the RBF kernel with SVM. We wanted to estimate the testing accuracy
using the raw unlabeled test dataset (10873 instances). Note that t-SNE is a
non-parametric mapping, therefore we cannot use the learnt model to map the
test datapoints to the embedded space which is formed by the train datapoints.
As an alternative we run t-SNE on the full dataset composed of both train and
test datapoints (Another approach is to train a multivariate regressor to predict
the map location from the input data [13]). We then fit an SVC model solely
based on the train embedded datapoints. This SVC model is used to estimate
probabilistic predictions of the membership of each embedded test point to each
of the 9 possible classes. The pipeline of this approach is depicted in Fig. 6.
Fig. 6. Testing Accuracy Pipeline
Note that the labels of these instances are not available, and the only way
of evaluation is to obtain the multi-class logarithmic loss by submitting our
predictions in probabilistic form to the dataset hosting platform (Kaggle) online.
The equation for the logarithmic loss is:
logloss = − 1
10873
10873∑
i=1
9∑
j=1
yij log pij
where yij = 1 if i belongs to class j and 0 otherwise, log is the natural logarithm
and pij is the probability that i belongs to class j as given by the classifier.
Our classifier achieves a testing logloss of 0.1719. This is fairly acceptable
given the simplicity of the employed feature set (1000 best features among 1,2,3,4
and 5 n-bytes grams) and without recurring to any involved feature engineer-
ing. A clueless classifier scores 2.1972. For this experiment we have used an
m5.4xlarge AWS EC2 instance (64 GB RAM) and a 500 GB volume.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have successfully applied feature extraction, selection, em-
bedding and visualization over a recent malware dataset. We have proposed a
pipeline that can cope with dataset of similar or larger size. We use the t-SNE
algorithm to embed the malware datapoints in 2D and visualize them as scatter
plots. A very interesting result is that compressing the data using t-SNE dra-
matically enhances the cross-validation accuracy of Support Vector Machines
classifiers. t-SNE shapes the clusterability of datapoints in the embedded space,
which is very appealing to SVM classifiers with the RBF kernel.
In future work, we aim to experiment with other feature sets, for instance
by analyzing the assembly data files. We also want to assess the viability of the
SVM–t-SNE classifier over other data sets. Another direction is to work on imple-
menting t-SNE in a 3D WebGL framework and integrate it in Jupyter notebooks.
Available GPUs can also be used to bear some of the tedious computations.
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